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 A B S T R A C T  
Law number 17 about State Finances in Article 11 states that the 
income of the country consists of tax revenue, non-tax revenue, and 
grants. From year to year the Indonesian government has always 
increase revenue target of taxation sector. On the side of the taxpayer 
(company), tax paid to the government will be recognized as an 
expense, which in turn tax will reduce the amount of net profit of the 
company. The company believes that tax evasion provide substantial 
economic benefits and un-expensive sources of financing. The purpose 
of this study was to examine and analyze whether the corporate 
government mechanism (institutional ownership concentration, the 
percentage of independent board, the number of commissioners, the 
number of audit committee, and quality audits) and accounting 
conservatism take effect on tax avoidance. This research is a 
quantitative research with the object of research is manufacturing 
companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2010 to 2013. Data 
were obtained from the publication of the audited financial 
statements or annual reports by IDX and book of ICMD. Sampling in 
this study used purposive random sampling. Data analysis techniques 
used in this research is regression analysis Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS). The results showed that the corporate governance mechanism 
influence on tax avoidance. Three of five proxy mechanism of 
corporate governance have significant effect on tax avoidance, those 
three proxies are institutional ownership, number of board of 
directors, and audit committees, while two other proxy are the 
percentage of independent board and audit quality which have un-
significant effect on tax avoidance.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Tax avoidance is one of the functions 
of tax planning. According to Dyreng, 
Hanlon, and Maydew (2010), tax avoidance is 
any activity that can reduce the effective tax 
rates paid by companies. Corporate tax 
avoidance decisions are made by managers 
(Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). Corporate tax 
avoidance opens opportunities for managers 
to be opportunistic by tax avoidance for short-
term profit purposes, not for long-term 
benefits expected by shareholders (Minnick 
and Noga, 2010). Only the pursuit of short-
term profits can be dangerous for the survival 
of a company's business. This is where good 
corporate governance (Good Corporate 
Governance) can control the effects of agency 
problems on tax avoidance (Desai and 
Dharmapala, 2006). Accounting conservatism 
that results in profit and asset figures that 
tend to be lower, and costs and debt figures 
tend to be higher, can indicate tax avoidance 
practices. Tax avoidance by companies is 
usually done through policies taken by the 
company and not accidentally (Budiman and 
Setyono, 2012). 
RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTING Trisusanti & Lasdi 
VOL. 1 NO 2. DECEMBER 2018 
115 
 Based on the background described 
above, the formulation of the problem is as 
follows. First, do corporate governance 
mechanisms (concentration of institutional 
ownership, percentage of independent 
commissioners, number of boards, number of 
audit committees, and audit quality) influence 
tax avoidance? Second, does accounting 
conservatism affect tax avoidance? The 
purpose of this research is first to examine 
and analyze the effect of corporate 
governance mechanisms (concentration of 
institutional ownership, percentage of 
independent commissioners, number of 
commissioners, number of audit committees, 
and audit quality) on tax avoidance. Second, 
to examine and analyze the effect of 
accounting conservatism on tax avoidance. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The emergence of the practice of tax 
avoidance can be explained by agency theory. 
From year to year, the government tries to 
increase state revenue through taxation. On 
the other hand, taxes have an essential role for 
the survival of the company, the fee paid by 
the company to the government will be 
recognized as an expense, so that in the end 
the tax will reduce the amount of net profit 
the company receives. The difference in views 
between the government and company 
management regarding fees, causing many 
companies when they have a high tax burden, 
will tend to encourage management to 
overcome them in various ways, one of them 
by manipulating corporate profits 
(Wulandari, Kumalahadi, and Prasetyo, 2004). 
 
Tax Evasion 
 Tax avoidance is one function of tax 
planning. Proper tax planning is tax planning 
that can distinguish between acts of tax 
avoidance with tax smuggling (tax evasion). 
Balter (1983) in Zain (2007: 49) defines tax 
smuggling as an attempt by taxpayers to 
reduce or write off tax debt based on the 
applicable provisions as a violation of taxation 
laws while tax avoidance means business is 
carried out by taxpayers. Whether successful 
or not, reduce or eliminate tax debt that does 
not violate the provisions of tax legislation.  
 
Corporate Governance 
 According to the Forum for Corporate 
Governance in Indonesia (FCGI, 2001), 
corporate governance is a set of regulations 
governing the relationship between the 
stakeholders. Stakeholders are shareholders, 
managers (managers) of the company, 
creditors, government, employees, and other 
internal and external stakeholders relating to 
rights and their obligations, or in other words, 
a system that regulates and controls the 
company. The corporate governance 
mechanism is a precise procedure and 
relationship between the party making 
decisions and those who manage or supervise 
the decisions. Several corporate governance 
mechanisms are often used in research to 
determine their effects on tax avoidance, 
including institutional ownership, the 
structure of the board of commissioners, audit 
committee, and audit quality (Annisa and 
Kurniasih, 2012). 
 
Accounting Conservatism 
 According to the FASB Statement of 
Concept No. 2, conservatism is a cautious 
reaction in the face of uncertainty to ensure 
that the change and risks inherent in a 
business situation have been considered. 
Juanda (2007) states that conservatism is an 
accounting principle that, if implemented, will 
result in profit and asset figures tend to 
below, as well as cost and debt figures tend to 
be high.  
 
Hypothesis Development 
 Companies that have a more 
substantial shareholding owned by other 
companies and the government will tend to be 
watched by institutional investors so that the 
performance of company management in 
obtaining the desired profits will get more 
excellent supervision by investors. This 
encourages company management to 
minimize the amount of tax owed to achieve 
the desired profit so that companies tend to 
RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTING Trisusanti & Lasdi 
VOL. 1 NO 2. DECEMBER 2018 
116 
avoid charges. Based on these explanations, a 
hypothesis can be arranged as follows: 
H1: The concentration of institutional 
ownership has a positive effect on tax 
avoidance. 
 The board of commissioners is the 
peak of the company's internal control. The 
board of commissioners has a significant role 
in implementing good corporate governance. 
With the board of commissioners, it is 
expected that financial reporting can be more 
reliable and relevant to its operational 
activities. Financial statements that are not 
appropriately monitored can be the start of 
company management to avoid tax. The 
independent commissioner is the best position 
to carry out the monitoring function to create 
good corporate governance (Ujiyantho and 
Pramuka, 2007). An increasing number of 
board of commissioners is expected to be able 
to carry out better-monitoring functions and 
financial reporting that is more reliable and 
relevant so that it can suppress the practice of 
tax avoidance. Based on these explanations, 
the following hypotheses can be arranged: 
H2a: Percentage of independent boards of the 
commission has a negative effect on tax 
avoidance. 
H2b: The number of the board of 
commissioners has a negative effect on tax 
avoidance. 
 An audit committee is a committee 
formed by the board of commissioners to 
oversee the company's management. The 
audit committee has the responsibility to 
assist the board of commissioners in carrying 
out their duties, especially those relating to 
company accounting policies, internal 
controls, and financial reporting systems. The 
audit committee's functioning effectively 
enables better control of the company and 
financial statements and supports good 
corporate governance (Andriyani, 2008 in 
Kurniasih and Sari, 2013). Annisa and 
Kurniasih (2012) and Dewi and Jati (2014) 
provide empirical evidence that there is a 
significant influence of the audit committee on 
tax avoidance. Based on these explanations, a 
hypothesis can be arranged as follows: 
H3: The number of audit committees has a 
negative effect on tax avoidance. 
 Users of financial statements think that 
audit quality can occur if the auditor can 
guarantee that there are no material 
misstatements or fraud in the audited 
financial statements. Annisa and Kurniasih 
(2012) stated that the audited financial 
statements by Big Four KAP auditors are 
considered to be more qualified because big 
four auditors are considered more able to 
limit earnings management practices 
compared to non-big four auditors. 
Companies that are not audited by the Big 
Four KAP can avoid more significant tax than 
companies that are reviewed by the Big Four 
KAP. Annisa and Kurniasih's research (2012) 
shows that there is a substantial effect of audit 
quality on tax avoidance. Based on these 
explanations, the following hypotheses can be 
arranged:  
H4: Audit quality has a negative effect on tax 
avoidance 
 Accounting conservatism produces 
profit and asset figures that tend to be lower, 
and costs and debt figures that tend to be 
higher can indicate the existence of tax 
avoidance practices. Companies with a high 
level of conservatism will produce lower 
profits so that the tax burden that should be 
paid is smaller and can indicate tax avoidance. 
Based on these explanations, the following 
hypotheses can be arranged: 
H5: Accounting conservatism has a positive 
effect on tax avoidance. 
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Model Analysis 
Figure 1: Model Analysis 
 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Research design 
 This research is quantitative research 
with hypothesis testing. Data collection 
techniques used in this study are data 
collection techniques in the database because 
this study uses secondary data obtained from 
the financial statements of companies listed 
on the IDX. 
 
Variable Identification, Operational Definitions, 
and Measurement of Variables 
 Tax avoidance is defined as an effort to 
reduce taxes but still comply with tax 
regulations, such as utilizing permitted 
exceptions and deductions and delaying taxes 
that have not been regulated in applicable tax 
regulations (Heru, 1997 in Budiman and 
Wijayanti, 2013). The concentration of 
institutional ownership is the shares of 
companies or institutions (insurance 
companies, banks, investment companies, and 
property of other institutions) (Tarjo, 2008). 
Independent Commissioners are members of 
the board of commissioners who are not 
affiliated with directors, other members of the 
board of commissioners, and controlling 
shareholders. They are free from business 
relationships or other relationships that can 
affect their ability to act independently or act 
solely in the interests of the company 
(National Committee on Governance Policy, 
2006). The board of commissioners is the 
organ of the company that is tasked with 
supervising in general and specifically 
following the articles of association and giving 
advice to directors (Law Number 40 of 2007). 
Audit Committee is a person or group of at 
least three independent people in a company 
that is also selected independently who has 
capabilities and competencies in accounting 
and finance. The audit committee is 
responsible to the board of commissioners 
(Pohan, 2008 in Annisa and Kurniasih, 2012). 
De Angelo (1981) defines audit quality as the 
probability that the auditor will find and 
report violations in the client's accounting 
system. Conservatism is defined as a prudent 
reaction to uncertainty, aimed at protecting 
the rights and interests of shareholders and 
debtors which determines a verification of a 
higher standard for recognizing good news 
than bad news (Lara, Osma, and Penalva, 
2005). 
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Table 1: Identification Variable 
Variable Simbol Measurement Reference Notes 
Tax avoidance TA_per Accrualsit/Assetsit-1 = 
αit + β1it (1/Assetsit-1) 
+ β2it 
{(ΔSALEit -
ΔA/Rit)/Assetsit- 1} + 
β3it (PPEit/Assetsit-1) + 
β4it ROAit + eit 
Desai
 d
an 
Dharmapala 
(2006) yang 
dimodifikasi 
oleh Lim 
(2011). 
Accruals = total accruals of 
company i in year t, calculated 
from ordinary income minus 
cash flows from operations. 
Assetsit-1 = total assets of 
company i in year t – 1. 
Tax avoidance TA_per   ΔSALEit = change in sales of 
company i in year t ΔA / Rit = 
change in trade receivables 
from company i in year t. 
PPEit = fixed assets (property, 
plant, equipment) of company i 
in year t. 
ROAit = net income of 
company i in year t divided by 
total assets. 
eit = residual of company i at 
year t, this residual is then 
declared as DA_per 
 
BTDit = b1 DA_perit + 
eit 
 BTDi, t = book-tax difference, or 
difference in earnings according 
to corporate accounting with 
income according to tax 
accounting, for company i in 
year t divided by total assets of 
the previous year. 
DA_peri, t = accrual 
discretionary of company i in 
year t. 
ei, t = residual from company i 
in year t, and is used as a 
measurement of tax avoidance. 
This residual is then stated 
as TA_per. 
 
Institutional 
Ownership 
INST INST = Number of 
Ownership 
Share -> Institutional/ 
Total Outstanding 
Shares 
 
 
Annisa, 
Ratnawati, 
dan Sofyan 
(2012) 
 
Percentage of 
Independent 
Board 
Commissioners 
INDP INDP = Number of 
Members Independent 
Commissioner -> 
Independent/ Total -> 
Total ->Members of the 
Board of Commissioners 
 
Mayangsari 
(2003) 
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Number of Board 
Commissioners 
DK Board of Commissioners 
variable 
measured by using the 
number of 
commissioners in a 
company 
 
Siallagan
 d
an 
Machfoedz 
(2006) 
 
Number of Audit 
Committee  
KOMITE Audit committee 
variables are measured 
by use 
the number of audit 
committees in a 
company 
 
Pohan
 (20
08) dalam 
Annisa dan 
Kurniasih 
(2012) 
 
Audit Quality AUDIT Audited company 
Big Firm will be given a 
value of 1 and if not 
audited Big Four Firm 
will be given a value of 0 
 
Annisa
 d
an 
Kurniasih 
(2012) 
Variabel Dummy 
Accounting 
Conservatism  
CONACC CONACCit = - (NIit – 
CFOit) 
Givoly dan 
Hayn 
(2000) 
NIit = net income before 
extraordinary items plus 
depreciation and amortization 
in company i in year t. 
CFOit = cash flow from 
operating activities at company 
i in year t.. 
 
Data Types and Data Sources 
 The type of data used in this study is 
quantitative data. Quantitative data in this 
study is based on audited financial statements 
or annual reports published by the IDX and 
ICMD books. The data source used in this 
study is secondary data. This study's data 
source is the audited financial statements or 
annual reports of manufacturing companies 
from 2010 to 2013. 
  
Population, Samples, and Sampling Techniques 
 The population in this study includes 
manufacturing companies listed on the Stock 
Exchange from 2010 to the end of 2013. 
Sampling in this study was conducted by 
purposive random sampling, which is part of 
the non-probability sampling method, namely 
the selection of non-random samples with the 
following criteria: 
1. Manufacturing companies listed 
successively on the IDX during the period 
2009-2013. 
2. Companies whose audited financial 
statements or annual reports can be accessed 
during the period 2010-2013. 
3. The company publishes audited financial 
statements or annual reports which are 
presented in rupiah during 2010-2013. 
4. Audited financial statements or annual 
reports have the data needed for four years of 
research (2010-2013). 
 
Data analysis technique 
 Hypotheses H1 through H5 will be 
tested using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression analysis with the following 
regression equation: 
TA_pert = α + β1INSTt-1 + β2INDPt-1 + 
β3DKt-1 + β4KOMITEt-1 + β5AUDITt-1 + 
β6CONACCt-1 + e 
Where : 
TA_per = tax avoidance in year t INST = 
institutional ownership in year t-1 
INDP = percentage of independent 
commissioners in year t-1 DK = number of 
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boards of commissioners in year t-1 
COMMITTEE = number of audit committees 
in year t-1 AUDIT = audit quality in year t-1 
CONACC = accounting conservatism in year 
t-1 α = constant 
β = regression coefficient 
e = error term 
The level of significance (α) used was 0.05. If 
the p-value is higher than the level of 
significance, the independent variable has no 
significant effect on the dependent variable. 
Conversely, if the p-value is lower than the 
level of significance, the independent variable 
has a significant impact on the dependent 
variable. 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
 The institutional ownership regression 
coefficient of 0.028 shows that institutional 
ownership has a positive effect on tax 
avoidance; if institutional ownership is higher, 
it will increase tax avoidance. Therefore, H1 
proposed in this study is "The concentration 
of institutional ownership has a positive effect 
on tax avoidance" is accepted because, based 
on statistical testing of the regression equation 
that the concentration of institutional 
ownership has a significant positive effect on 
tax avoidance. This positive effect means that 
the higher the level of institutional ownership, 
the greater the tax avoidance that is carried 
out. Increasing the concentration of 
institutional ownership will encourage 
company management to achieve the desired 
profits so that companies tend to avoid tax. 
 H2a proposed in this study is "The 
percentage of independent commissioners has 
a negative effect on tax avoidance." H2a was 
rejected because, based on the regression 
equation's statistical testing, the percentage of 
the board of independent directors had no 
significant effect on tax avoidance. The results 
of this study confirm Annisa and Kurniasih's 
(2012) research that the percentage of 
independent commissioners does not have a 
significant and negative effect on tax 
avoidance. Like the results of this study, the 
rate of independent commissioners does not 
significantly influence tax avoidance but has a 
positive impact on tax avoidance. This is 
different from the results of Annisa and 
Kurniasih's (2012) research. This shows that 
an independent board of commissioners is not 
useful in implementing good corporate 
governance, so it does not prevent tax 
avoidance. A member of the company's 
independent board of commissioners is 
possible only to fulfill the stipulated 
provisions.  
 H2b proposed in this study is "The 
number of boards of commissioners has a 
negative effect on tax avoidance." H2b is 
rejected because, based on the regression 
equation's statistical testing, the number of 
boards of commissioners has a significant 
positive effect on tax avoidance. This positive 
effect indicates that the more the number of 
boards of commissioners, the higher the 
company's tax avoidance. Annisa and 
Kurniasih (2012) stated that the effectiveness 
of control over tax avoidance depends on the 
values, norms, and trust received in a 
company and the role of the board of 
commissioners in controlling management 
activities, so it can be said that the board of 
commissioners supports the management of 
the company to minimize the amount of tax 
burden owed by the company through tax 
avoidance activities.  
 H3 proposed in this study is "The 
number of audit committees has a negative 
effect on tax avoidance." H3 is accepted 
because, based on the regression equation's 
statistical testing, the number of audit 
committees has a significant negative effect on 
tax avoidance. This study confirms Annisa 
and Kurniasih's (2012) research that the 
number of audit committees has a significant 
positive impact on tax avoidance. Like the 
results of this study, the number of audit 
committees has a substantial effect on tax 
avoidance but has a contrary nature towards 
tax avoidance. This negative effect means that 
the more the number of audit committees, the 
tax avoidance will be reduced, so it can be 
said that the function of the audit committee 
has run effectively and supports good 
corporate governance.  
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 H4 proposed in this study is "Audit 
quality has a negative effect on tax 
avoidance." H4 is rejected because it is based 
on the regression equation's statistical testing 
that audit quality does not significantly 
influence tax avoidance. These results confirm 
the research of Jaya et al. (2013). In the study 
of Annisa and Kurniasih (2012), audit quality 
has a significant positive effect on tax 
avoidance. In the review of Jaya et al. (2013), 
audit quality does not affect tax avoidance. 
According to Jaya et al. (2013), it is tax ethics 
that influence taxpayers to avoid taxation and 
do not see the results of audits of corporate 
financial statements as a consideration in tax 
avoidance. The higher the moral ethics, the 
lower the taxpayer's intention to avoid tax. 
 H5 proposed in this study is 
"Accounting conservatism has a positive effect 
on tax avoidance." H5 is rejected because, 
based on statistical testing of the regression 
equation that accounting conservatism has no 
significant effect on tax avoidance. The 
existence of taxation laws regarding the use of 
conservatism limits companies to carry out tax 
avoidance through the principle of 
conservatism. One of them is the Article 9 of 
the Income Tax Act concerning expenses that 
cannot be deducted in the fiscal income 
statement, thus causing a budgetary 
reconciliation regarding any formation or 
accumulation of reserve funds (uncollectible 
receivables, inventory losses, etc.) by the 
company. The allowance for damages will be 
corrected positively fiscal, which will cause 
the company's profits to increase, so that 
management cannot carry out tax avoidance 
through the principles of conservatism. 
 
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND 
SUGGESTIONS 
Conclusion 
 Based on the results of the analysis 
and discussion discussed earlier, it can be 
concluded that first, the corporate governance 
mechanism influences tax avoidance. Second, 
accounting conservatism does not affect the 
level of tax avoidance in the company. 
 
Limitation 
 The first limitation is the 
generalization of the results of this study is in 
companies engaged in the manufacturing 
sector. The second limitation is based on the 
results of the test of the coefficient of 
determination can be interpreted the ability of 
institutional ownership variables, the 
percentage of independent commissioners, the 
number of commissioners, audit committees, 
audit quality and accounting conservatism in 
explaining the variable tax avoidance is 
limited, only able to explain variations of 
5.9%. In contrast, the remaining 94.1% is 
influenced by other factors. The third 
limitation is that the period in this study is 
only four years, namely the period 2010-2013. 
Extensive research on accounting 
conservatism is carried out observations of the 
five-year research period. This research is 
limited by the year the Income Tax Law No. 
36 of 2008, which entered into force in 2010, so 
the period of this study began from 2010 to 
2013. 
 
Suggestion 
 The first suggestion is that further 
research can further expand the sample, so it 
is not limited to manufacturing companies. 
The second suggestion is to add another 
independent variable that can explain tax 
avoidance appropriately or replace other 
proxies to get the right independent variable, 
such as company risk, company size, fiscal 
loss compensation, etc. The third suggestion is 
to expand the research period, which can be 
done at least five years from the research 
period since the enactment of the Income Tax 
Law No. 36 of 2008, which came into force in 
2010. 
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